How The Grand Canyon Dams Saved Arizona and the American West
(A Fabulation the Moral of Which Remains Relevant)*
(revised 8 Sep 2019)
(revised 8 Sep 2019)
This story is usually told in the celebratory terms of the western boomer and booster, lauding the accomplishments of statesmen and engineers in the endless unrolling of American Manifest Destiny and Civilizing the Wild Frontier.
My effort here offers a behind-the-scenes look at the politics and politicking that brought to fruition Western water resources planning of the middle twentieth century. Starting with the 1920-30's triumph of California in obtaining federal construction of mighty Hoover dam, the narrative usually moves to the compelling clash between the Colorado River's Upper and Lower Basin water policy-makers that brought about the taming of the upper Colorado behind Flaming Gorge and Glen Canyon dams.
An entertaining sidebar to that wonderful accomplishment was the resolution of the dispute between defenders of our great National Park System and those who wanted every foot and acre-foot of the Colorado to be put to constructive human use. That dispute, of course, was resolved after an energetic public relations and congressional lobbying campaign when the federal government decided that a third great dam, to be located in Dinosaur National Monument (now an expanded Park), was not immediately needed and should be left out of the 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act (CRSPA). This was claimed by Park protectionists as a fine victory that reinforced existing law barring dam projects from National Parks and Monuments.
The third leg of the Colorado River development stool was to have been the Bridge Canyon Project bringing water from just upstream of Hoover Dam's Lake Mead down to the ever-thirsty deserts and residents of central Arizona. Conceived of as using a tunnel from behind the dam itself, the Bureau of Reclamation chose instead to copy the solution used for southern California and take the water from a holding lake downstream of mighty Hoover (insuring its stunning power generation capacity would not be affected), and using Bridge Canyon dam to generate the power to pump the water up from the river and over to Phoenix.
First brought into the congressional arena in the late 1940's, this Bridge Canyon -- or more adequately, Central Arizona -- project had to be put on hold in 1952 because Congress demanded that Arizona and California go to the Supreme Court to settle outstanding questions of sharing the Colorado's waters.
First brought into the congressional arena in the late 1940's, this Bridge Canyon -- or more adequately, Central Arizona -- project had to be put on hold in 1952 because Congress demanded that Arizona and California go to the Supreme Court to settle outstanding questions of sharing the Colorado's waters.
Attention then turned to enacting CRSPA, including that side show of protecting the National Park System at Echo Park in Dinosaur National Monuments. Interestingly, this protectionist question had come up with respect to Bridge Canyon since the huge dam of that name would have had a reservoir that would have backed water into a bit of the western edge of Grand Canyon National Park. No controversy arose however, because protectionists, led by Bestor Robinson of California's Sierra Club had studied the matter -- along with Park Service eminences such as F.L.Olmsted and R.McKee -- and was able to get Club and thus protectionist approval of a slightly amended Bridge Canyon dam in 1949.
The 1950's were years of triumph and difficulty for protectionists and other conservationists. The Eisenhower administration was not always friendly to their concerns. Indeed, the "Echo Park fight" became bitter and angry at times. Echo Park was dam-free; Rainbow Bridge National Monument was invaded. Although the end result was a decision not to build the dam in Dinosaur, protectionists were worn and battered as the 1950's wound down. This was an important consideration, for their central nation-wide issue had become the passage of an act for congressional protection of the remaining wild lands of America in a National Wilderness Preservation System. (A huge effort that culminated in passage of a compromised bill in 1964.)
Personnel matter too, whether or not you accept a simple-minded theory of Great Men of History. Stimulated by the ideas and vigor of the Echo Park and Wilderness Act efforts, an attempt was made to expand the vision of the Sierra Club, for one instance, to protect wild and scenic lands whether in Parks or undesignated. The ensuing discussion only magnified differences of opinion between activist and conventional thinking. The broader view, championed by Executive Director David Brower, found much support, particularly in reviewing and previewing what was to be done about Bridge Canyon dam and its impact on an enlarged conception of the entire Grand Canyon. However, Brower was already in trouble over his expansionist plans for a grandiose publications program. So he was an easy target for the well-placed B.Robinson and those like him who preferred to scale down controversy until it could be handled quietly by those in the know (even if not in the limelight), and Brower was fired. Another depressing feature of those years was the revelation (to most) of the deleterious impacts of CRSPA dams on the unmatchable country of the Colorado Plateau. As Glen dam was completed and starting to fill in the mid-'60's, there were some scattered voices raised in lament, if not protest. A new Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall (of Arizona), illustrated the changing politics, as he championed scenic values even as his Department prepared for the resumption of an effort to authorize Bridge Canyon and its Central Arizona Project.
A changing view was necessary since some realities of the Colorado River Basin (CRB) were becoming more and more obvious as the Supreme Court decision on Arizona v. California loomed. The facts and the predictions were coming into agreement: The Basin did not produce enough water on a reliable year-after-year basis to take care of all the demands that would be authorized once all three legs of the CRB stool were completed. Secretary Udall, utilizing the Bureau of Reclamation's expertise and ambition, rose to the occasion with a grandiose Pacific Southwest Water Plan (PSWP). It was full of projects and water-supply strategies aimed at utilizing and quantifying that area's resources. Recognizing that there would be a water shortage in coming decades, the plan pronounced the CRB was too small a concept -- a west-wide solution was necessary. Consequently, the plan was enlarged in two significant ways: water would be sought from the nation's areas that had and would have a surplus, and that water would be transported from its source to the needy Pacific Southwest (e.g., Los Angeles) by mind-boggling waterworks that would be financed by the Reclamation magic of using the Grand Canyon as the site, not just of one dam to help the Central Arizona canal (CAP), but of two majestic concrete hydroelectric generating dams that would over the coming decades produce the tens and hundreds of millions of dollars necessary for a gigantic water importation that would "make the Colorado River whole".
Something so breath-taking was bound to be controversial. Western legislators were used to bargaining and horse-trading to get their projects, just like anyone. The venerable Senator Hayden of Arizona (in Congress for over 50 years) worried his pet CAP might be side-lined by the PSWP. California, on the other hand, was delighted -- and no wonder since it was actually using well over the amount of Colorado River water it was legally entitled to. Other states felt left out, and clamored to be included. The protectionists, thinking back to their Echo Park victory of a decade before, raised questions about whether these "river monsters" would need to be operated in ways that would harm the National Park. However, the National Park Service (NPS) had conceded back in the 1930's that dams would be built and the patchwork of NPS units in the Grand Canyon could not block them. Nevertheless, NPS made its case for protection values, and found a friendly ear because of Udall's growing interest in scenic and environmental issues. However, the weight of Reclamation within Interior and the array of powerful congressional advocates for its work were brought to bear. The end result of this largely internal discussion was that the Park Service was advised and ordered to follow departmental policy and not raise objections to Reclamation plans for the Grand Canyon.
The big gorilla in the PSWP's path, however, was not subject to such Southwest-based pressures. Senator Henry Jackson of Washington state was not happy at all to see a federal plan that assumed water from the Northwest (the Columbia River primarily) was for sale. He occupied the key position of chairman of the Senate Interior Committee that would have to approve any and all parts of the Udall PSWP. He, along with Northwesterners in general, took a strong stand that there was not really a surplus at all of Northwest water, no matter what the numbers might say. He was adamant that there not even be a study of those numbers, and was scornful of the Southwest's "shortage", that just looked like a power grab to him. Udall's big plan looked in trouble.
A few words about 1960's congressional politics (now vanished): There was more collegiality. Good relations could be more important than policy details. Seniority had way more weight. People (yes, almost all men, white men) stayed longer. The Democratic Party members exercised dominance from the 1930's for over half a century. They believed Congress existed to accomplish things that would make the U.S. what they thought would be a better, more prosperous, more secure, country. Etc. This different way of operating is important to understand since much of what happened with the new CRB legislation was done by people used to discussing matters, wrangling and compromising, and then settling those matters, often out of public sight.
Our fabulous narrative has now reached the point, 1965, where the Supreme Court has decided, and Senator Hayden has resurrected his CAP including, to help pay for it and its operational costs, Bridge Canyon dam. The Secretary has launched his PSWP, thus providing Basin-wide context and support for authorization of Hayden's cherished works. In the PSWP, California could see protection of its water over-draft of the Colorado. It could see the promise of a federal commitment, in studies and dam revenues, to the end-of-the-century provision of an "endless" new water supply. With Arizona and California conciliated and in partnership, it was the turn to woo the upper basin. Important here was House Interior Committee chairman Aspinall of Colorado. Entrenched, experienced, committed to water development of his area and the Southwest, and wily, Aspinall was the key to House approval. Secretary Udall's path to Aspinall's support was first, through provisions in the PSWP that ensured Colorado would never have to fear not getting its share of the river -- including for the burgeoning front range cities. Aspinall would be a state-wide hero. Second, was Udall. Not the Secretary, but his brother Morris, a key Democrat on Aspinall's committee, and as politically adept as they come, if with many fewer years to his credit. What Representative Udall offered was to do the legwork, to craft the legislative provisions, under Aspinall's eagle eye, so that all interests were included (a must in Aspinall's modus operandi), while opposition inside and outside the Committee was reduced to cranks and Republicans. Rep. Udall was designated by Aspinall to work up such a bill for hearings and mark-up action by early summer 1966.
The story of Echo Park dam was near the front of Sec. Udall's thinking. Many current legislators had been around for that fight, and Udall wanted no repeat. He struck first. The fame of the Grand Canyon and the existence of two NPS units there, and the proposal for two big dams and two smaller ones, led him to present his NPS Director in a big show to explain to the public how considerations of protectionists had been taken into account. NPS studies had been done over the years; river trips on the remote Colorado had made clear that public interest in the Grand Canyon would be better served by reservoirs. NPS was ready to make plans for facilities for National Recreation Areas to take full advantage of the new reservoirs and those above and below the Grand Canyon. The recreational potential of the Colorado Plateau would make it a playground crown for the Park-worthy jewels the area was overrun with.
Protectionists, remembering the bitterness and cost of fighting a dam in Dinosaur, and grateful for the work done to bring to success the 1964 Wilderness Act, were cautiously optimistic that no precedent was being set that would threaten other NPS units. The Sierra Club had modified its 1949 resolution under the leadership of Robinson and his allies. The new position accepted the importance of resolving CRB issues, asked for minor modifications in dam construction to avoid setting any precedents, urged that most of the rest of the two NPS units in the Canyon be put into the Wilderness System, and that the boundaries of the two units be adjusted so as to include in the Park more relevant parts of the Canyon. With that, the Club and its protectionist allies conditionally endorsed the projects.
Interestingly, a history professor and river runner, R.F.Nash, in a celebratory and path-breaking 1967 book about American wilderness, lamented that so soon after the Wilderness Act, one of America's great wild rivers had "been surrendered without a fight" to the ever-encroaching forces that were leading to the disappearance of America's great heritage of primitive lands. His was a lonely voice, along with that of the Leopolds, Bradleys, Browers, et al., none of whom commanded the institutional resources or nation-wide receptive audience that had made Echo Park a watchword for Park protection. Even the National Parks Association was accepting.
And that left Senator Henry Jackson of Washington.
His chairmanship of the Senate' Interior Committee had come from the bounty of a very senior and able Senator Anderson of New Mexico (another CRB state). They were colleagues and allies. Hayden, exercising his prerogatives, claimed a seat on the Committee at this critical time for the CAP. With these three together, Committee direction and control was assured. The Senators (Republicans) from Colorado and California were neutered by their states' acceptance of the PSWP essentials. With the three key Democrats working together, what Aspinall/Udall could put together in the House would easily be slid through the Senate once it was made acceptable to Jackson.
However, Jackson had already said, "No." -- no-one would be sticking a hose into the Northwest's water and sucking it dry. End of story. Really? Well, not in the congressional politics of those days. Jackson's position put him in control of the agenda and action. But confrontation in water politics was really not the way things were done. (We are not talking about a hot national issue such as civil rights and the South, here.) So Jackson had to be conciliated and brought along; that was the way for the other players -- Hayden, Anderson, Aspinall and the Udalls -- to do it. And that meant he could be brought along only if his core interests were respected. He could not play dog in the manger. He could not be run over either.
So here was the situation: Aspinall/Udall were working to get their bill through the House, with lots of time in 1965-6 to reach that goal. A balanced-interests bill, nested in Sec. Udall's PSWP, would likely arrive at the Senate looking reasonable and with wide support. Meanwhile, in the Senate, with a few chats here, a late afternoon drink there, a meal or two, perhaps a late-night card game; certainly with much scurrying about and carrying of papers by key aides and even Sec. Udall's staff, the discussion went on.
Jackson laid out a flanking action, and got Sec. Udall to agree to the creation of a National Water Commission, under which any studies of moving water from one river basin to another would be organized and conducted. That way, there would be no chance the Bureau of Reclamation would go off on its own and come back with a full-fledged proposal to send Columbia water south. Aspinall thought it was all face-saving, but he prioritized getting legislation through that recognized the coming shortage and the need to get ready for it. There was some inter-house huffing and puffing, but the Commission bill passed, and Jackson had one protection.
The bigger problem, Jackson thought, was the huge treasure chest that would be built up by power revenues from the PSWP's dams -- spinning gold kilowatts to steal his water, Jackson called it. On the other hand, he accepted that those revenues were needed to make Hayden's CAP and other CRB waterworks balance out financially. First, he turned to Hayden and Anderson. What he wanted was a way to restrict the dam revenues so that the CAP and core projects would be covered, but that beyond that, the revenue should go to the Treasury or into some other account like Social Security or something so that it would not build up into a "loaded gun aimed at the Northwest", a weapon that would get more deadly over coming decades. In the end, Sec. Udall's staff came up with a bundle of creative solutions -- locks to put on the revenues with various keys and time limits before they could be considered for import works, or even studies. Everyone knew these were not foolproof -- fools being anyone who thought one Congress could bind a later one forever and ever.
For sure, though, Jackson could claim that studies would be controlled out of Reclamation hands, and money would be locked away in non-CRB vaults. These negotiations --high-level, multiple parties, secret mostly -- gained the support of the Senators with the power, as well as Aspinall's assent.
1966 arrived with apparent agreement. In the House, the discipline of Aspinall and the creative politicking of Rep. Udall, got the legislation, a most unwieldy, Rube Goldberg kind of contraption, finished, and through the Committee, onto the House floor, and over to the Senate. It arrived even as the negotiators on Jackson's lock-boxes were agreed, and the Senate was ready to act. Once passed, the bill went into conference. Aspinall did not like some of the locks, and so they did some fiddling with the obligation to supply Mexico with its share of the Colorado. In the end, all parties were happy; the sausage patties of the 1966 Colorado River Basin Development and Water Augmentation Act, gristly and with some suspect elements, seemed nutritious.
President Johnson was happy to sign. Hayden was happy to retire. And today, the waterworks are built and in use. Of course, water IS short. But there is no pipe in the Columbia.
Oh yes. About the Grand Canyon Industrial & Recreation Area. It is quite popular, even given all the smog from the coal plants clustered about. The continuing drought and wildly fluctuating levels of the two new reservoirs do play hob with the landscape and recreation. Revenues are not quite what the Bureau predicted. Boating is mostly forbidden, given the fluctuations, unpredictability, and side canyons' muck. The Park boundaries were rectified, but the uranium trucks make many of the roads unpalatable for tourists. The Paria and Coconino silt traps are full and spilling. Scenic flights are restricted due to smog and the proliferation of long-distance power lines. The Little Colorado and Bass Trail tramways are popular with the Las Vegas day-tours.
The colossus that is America roars ahead, though lately there is chatter about the 5-degree rise in world temperatures.
*About that moral: Dont believe everything you read.
Even if its history.
Especially if its history.
Much of the above story is made up of cloth that is partially my weaving but with much of the real stuff. I apologize if I have offended anyone. This is all in good sport (debate).
I want my counter-narrative to make this significant point: The Grand Canyon has no dams because of the Sierra Club and its Executive Director, David Brower. They, and many tens of thousands of people publicly voiced their views, raised the alarm, made the clamor, commanded the attention of the powerful, and saved the Canyon.
Political machinations of course were involved in this federal governmental effort. Powerful men pushing legitimate interests shaped the results. Yet if the Sierra Club and other voices of America had not championed the cause of an undammed Grand Canyon, those powerful men would have, in pushing their interests, brought about a dammed Canyon.
I bow the knee to Henry Jackson; I admired him (he wasnt perfect, of course). And his staff, though we quarreled on other occasions. In particular, his protege, Representative Tom Foley, (who rose to be Speaker of the House), I would like to think of as a friend and counselor in those fraught years when we, the American people, saved the Grand Canyon.
Our fabulous narrative has now reached the point, 1965, where the Supreme Court has decided, and Senator Hayden has resurrected his CAP including, to help pay for it and its operational costs, Bridge Canyon dam. The Secretary has launched his PSWP, thus providing Basin-wide context and support for authorization of Hayden's cherished works. In the PSWP, California could see protection of its water over-draft of the Colorado. It could see the promise of a federal commitment, in studies and dam revenues, to the end-of-the-century provision of an "endless" new water supply. With Arizona and California conciliated and in partnership, it was the turn to woo the upper basin. Important here was House Interior Committee chairman Aspinall of Colorado. Entrenched, experienced, committed to water development of his area and the Southwest, and wily, Aspinall was the key to House approval. Secretary Udall's path to Aspinall's support was first, through provisions in the PSWP that ensured Colorado would never have to fear not getting its share of the river -- including for the burgeoning front range cities. Aspinall would be a state-wide hero. Second, was Udall. Not the Secretary, but his brother Morris, a key Democrat on Aspinall's committee, and as politically adept as they come, if with many fewer years to his credit. What Representative Udall offered was to do the legwork, to craft the legislative provisions, under Aspinall's eagle eye, so that all interests were included (a must in Aspinall's modus operandi), while opposition inside and outside the Committee was reduced to cranks and Republicans. Rep. Udall was designated by Aspinall to work up such a bill for hearings and mark-up action by early summer 1966.
The story of Echo Park dam was near the front of Sec. Udall's thinking. Many current legislators had been around for that fight, and Udall wanted no repeat. He struck first. The fame of the Grand Canyon and the existence of two NPS units there, and the proposal for two big dams and two smaller ones, led him to present his NPS Director in a big show to explain to the public how considerations of protectionists had been taken into account. NPS studies had been done over the years; river trips on the remote Colorado had made clear that public interest in the Grand Canyon would be better served by reservoirs. NPS was ready to make plans for facilities for National Recreation Areas to take full advantage of the new reservoirs and those above and below the Grand Canyon. The recreational potential of the Colorado Plateau would make it a playground crown for the Park-worthy jewels the area was overrun with.
Protectionists, remembering the bitterness and cost of fighting a dam in Dinosaur, and grateful for the work done to bring to success the 1964 Wilderness Act, were cautiously optimistic that no precedent was being set that would threaten other NPS units. The Sierra Club had modified its 1949 resolution under the leadership of Robinson and his allies. The new position accepted the importance of resolving CRB issues, asked for minor modifications in dam construction to avoid setting any precedents, urged that most of the rest of the two NPS units in the Canyon be put into the Wilderness System, and that the boundaries of the two units be adjusted so as to include in the Park more relevant parts of the Canyon. With that, the Club and its protectionist allies conditionally endorsed the projects.
Interestingly, a history professor and river runner, R.F.Nash, in a celebratory and path-breaking 1967 book about American wilderness, lamented that so soon after the Wilderness Act, one of America's great wild rivers had "been surrendered without a fight" to the ever-encroaching forces that were leading to the disappearance of America's great heritage of primitive lands. His was a lonely voice, along with that of the Leopolds, Bradleys, Browers, et al., none of whom commanded the institutional resources or nation-wide receptive audience that had made Echo Park a watchword for Park protection. Even the National Parks Association was accepting.
And that left Senator Henry Jackson of Washington.
His chairmanship of the Senate' Interior Committee had come from the bounty of a very senior and able Senator Anderson of New Mexico (another CRB state). They were colleagues and allies. Hayden, exercising his prerogatives, claimed a seat on the Committee at this critical time for the CAP. With these three together, Committee direction and control was assured. The Senators (Republicans) from Colorado and California were neutered by their states' acceptance of the PSWP essentials. With the three key Democrats working together, what Aspinall/Udall could put together in the House would easily be slid through the Senate once it was made acceptable to Jackson.
However, Jackson had already said, "No." -- no-one would be sticking a hose into the Northwest's water and sucking it dry. End of story. Really? Well, not in the congressional politics of those days. Jackson's position put him in control of the agenda and action. But confrontation in water politics was really not the way things were done. (We are not talking about a hot national issue such as civil rights and the South, here.) So Jackson had to be conciliated and brought along; that was the way for the other players -- Hayden, Anderson, Aspinall and the Udalls -- to do it. And that meant he could be brought along only if his core interests were respected. He could not play dog in the manger. He could not be run over either.
So here was the situation: Aspinall/Udall were working to get their bill through the House, with lots of time in 1965-6 to reach that goal. A balanced-interests bill, nested in Sec. Udall's PSWP, would likely arrive at the Senate looking reasonable and with wide support. Meanwhile, in the Senate, with a few chats here, a late afternoon drink there, a meal or two, perhaps a late-night card game; certainly with much scurrying about and carrying of papers by key aides and even Sec. Udall's staff, the discussion went on.
Jackson laid out a flanking action, and got Sec. Udall to agree to the creation of a National Water Commission, under which any studies of moving water from one river basin to another would be organized and conducted. That way, there would be no chance the Bureau of Reclamation would go off on its own and come back with a full-fledged proposal to send Columbia water south. Aspinall thought it was all face-saving, but he prioritized getting legislation through that recognized the coming shortage and the need to get ready for it. There was some inter-house huffing and puffing, but the Commission bill passed, and Jackson had one protection.
The bigger problem, Jackson thought, was the huge treasure chest that would be built up by power revenues from the PSWP's dams -- spinning gold kilowatts to steal his water, Jackson called it. On the other hand, he accepted that those revenues were needed to make Hayden's CAP and other CRB waterworks balance out financially. First, he turned to Hayden and Anderson. What he wanted was a way to restrict the dam revenues so that the CAP and core projects would be covered, but that beyond that, the revenue should go to the Treasury or into some other account like Social Security or something so that it would not build up into a "loaded gun aimed at the Northwest", a weapon that would get more deadly over coming decades. In the end, Sec. Udall's staff came up with a bundle of creative solutions -- locks to put on the revenues with various keys and time limits before they could be considered for import works, or even studies. Everyone knew these were not foolproof -- fools being anyone who thought one Congress could bind a later one forever and ever.
For sure, though, Jackson could claim that studies would be controlled out of Reclamation hands, and money would be locked away in non-CRB vaults. These negotiations --high-level, multiple parties, secret mostly -- gained the support of the Senators with the power, as well as Aspinall's assent.
1966 arrived with apparent agreement. In the House, the discipline of Aspinall and the creative politicking of Rep. Udall, got the legislation, a most unwieldy, Rube Goldberg kind of contraption, finished, and through the Committee, onto the House floor, and over to the Senate. It arrived even as the negotiators on Jackson's lock-boxes were agreed, and the Senate was ready to act. Once passed, the bill went into conference. Aspinall did not like some of the locks, and so they did some fiddling with the obligation to supply Mexico with its share of the Colorado. In the end, all parties were happy; the sausage patties of the 1966 Colorado River Basin Development and Water Augmentation Act, gristly and with some suspect elements, seemed nutritious.
President Johnson was happy to sign. Hayden was happy to retire. And today, the waterworks are built and in use. Of course, water IS short. But there is no pipe in the Columbia.
Oh yes. About the Grand Canyon Industrial & Recreation Area. It is quite popular, even given all the smog from the coal plants clustered about. The continuing drought and wildly fluctuating levels of the two new reservoirs do play hob with the landscape and recreation. Revenues are not quite what the Bureau predicted. Boating is mostly forbidden, given the fluctuations, unpredictability, and side canyons' muck. The Park boundaries were rectified, but the uranium trucks make many of the roads unpalatable for tourists. The Paria and Coconino silt traps are full and spilling. Scenic flights are restricted due to smog and the proliferation of long-distance power lines. The Little Colorado and Bass Trail tramways are popular with the Las Vegas day-tours.
The colossus that is America roars ahead, though lately there is chatter about the 5-degree rise in world temperatures.
###
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- *About that moral: Dont believe everything you read.
Even if its history.
Especially if its history.
Much of the above story is made up of cloth that is partially my weaving but with much of the real stuff. I apologize if I have offended anyone. This is all in good sport (debate).
I want my counter-narrative to make this significant point: The Grand Canyon has no dams because of the Sierra Club and its Executive Director, David Brower. They, and many tens of thousands of people publicly voiced their views, raised the alarm, made the clamor, commanded the attention of the powerful, and saved the Canyon.
Political machinations of course were involved in this federal governmental effort. Powerful men pushing legitimate interests shaped the results. Yet if the Sierra Club and other voices of America had not championed the cause of an undammed Grand Canyon, those powerful men would have, in pushing their interests, brought about a dammed Canyon.
I bow the knee to Henry Jackson; I admired him (he wasnt perfect, of course). And his staff, though we quarreled on other occasions. In particular, his protege, Representative Tom Foley, (who rose to be Speaker of the House), I would like to think of as a friend and counselor in those fraught years when we, the American people, saved the Grand Canyon.
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