H. Jackson, the Sierra Club, and Saving the Canyon

OH! Its Complicated...

How Henry Jackson and the Sierra Club Saved the Grand Canyon

or

Sometimes Actions Speak Louder

But We Must Listen

In his 2002 Still the Wild River Runs/ Congress, the Sierra Club, and the Fight to Save Grand Canyon, Byron Pearson writes (Introduction xvi-xvii)

"the documentary record and (Secretary Stewart) Udall's own personal recollections support a conclusion that he made his decision (to seek alternatives to the Grand Canyon dams) out of political pragmatism to gain the support of Washington Henry Jackson, who, as chairman of the Senate Interior Committee, had opposed the dams because they were the primary means of financing the importation of water into the Colorado River Basin from the Pacific Northwest. ... I believe that the evidence supports my premise that Stewart Udall would have supported the construction of the Grand Canyon dams had congressional support for them existed in late 1966. Hence, I will argue throughout this book that despite the (save the Grand Canyon) national publicity campaign, it appears as though the Grand Canyon dams were eliminated  because of the aggregate effects of the political intrigue between Arizona and California and Stewart Udall's political pragmatism, rather than as a result of the environmentalist' ability to influence Congress."

In other posts, I have argued (1) that had the "national publicity campaign" to save the Grand Canyon not existed, supporters of the dams, including the Secretary, would have used "political intrigue and pragmatism" to mollify Senator Jackson so that the dams could be authorized but not used to threaten control over the Pacific Northwest's water resources, and (2) that the complexities of the story of the dams, one Pearson tries here to simplify, built over the years to the situation where a national campaign like the one the Sierra Club was prominent in re-worked the ground and context in which individuals made their decisions about the dams.

I think that last statement can be elaborated as it affected Pearson's principal protagonists, S. Udall and Jackson. Simply stated, they were both attuned to the same national cultural factors that were increasingly giving the Sierra Club its impact and influence. They eliminated the dams from the legislative process because they chose "saving" the Grand Canyon over "damming" it. The conservationists' campaign and the essential truth of it provided acceptable justification to defy the traditional mode of providing for developing the West's natural resources. 

Senator Henry Jackson first. The most entertaining way to understand the scope and intensity of his pro-conservation stance is to read the history of the creation of the North Cascades National Park. (See Contested Terrain: The Establishment of North Cascades National Park https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/noca/adhi/chap1.htm) 

This National Park Service narrative makes quite clear Jackson's willing and eager leadership in bringing about legislative success for the long-considered issue of managing the North Cascades. This was the work of someone alert both to the resources (and desires to exploit them) and the wonders of the area. It was not the work of someone of narrow views (cf. Colorado's Wayne Aspinall, House Interior Committee chair in this period). And not just the Sierra Club was involved in helping construct the legislation; a whole spectrum of organizations and individuals was passionately involved. Had Jackson been just the intriguer and pragmatist of Pearson's view, he would not have bothered with such an issue.

And here's a clincher: Work on the North Cascades legislation proceeded and reached its climax in exactly the same time period as the Colorado Basin legislation. The bills were signed at same time, along with, I might add, another contentious Park bill out of Jackson's committee, the Redwoods National Park. Jackson was a master at chewing the gum of protecting his region and walking the conservationist/Sierra Club walk -- what Pearson (sneeringly?) refers to as preservationists.

There is much else to write about Jackson's environmental credentials and accomplishments. Suffice it to say that trying to diminish it to playing dog-in-the-manger over the Columbia is a deeply erroneous reading of history.

To this evidence, I will add my own experience from 1966-8, when as Sierra Club Southwest Representative, I spent much time in Washington lobbying on behalf of the Canyon. Among my most enjoyable, fruitful, educational, and politically intriguing times were those I spent discussing matters with Northwesterners Rep. Thomas Foley and Jackson's AA Sterling Munro. I find deep personal satisfaction that these times, along with others of similar kind, constituted and verified the alliance that the Northwest and the Sierra Club formed against the would-be dammers. We each played our roles: the Northwest with its political weight, position, and acumen, and the Sierra Club with its noisy, obstreperous national campaign arousing public sympathy and desire to "save" the Grand Canyon.

Stewart Udall. As I have written elsewhere, the Udall brothers were, in my understanding, consummate politicians. With a Democratic allegiance; with a liberal bent. And by politicians, I mean they had the ability to be convincingly on any side of an issue they were involved in. S. Udall's environmentalist credentials as he matured in public office and after are available to be read about elsewhere. I want to concentrate on that moment Pearson alludes to, when in late 1966, Udall's support for the dams evaporated and in September he ordered the Bureau of Reclamation to find damless alternatives for the Central Arizona Project authorization. (They came up with 30, including the one that was enacted.)

Pearson writes "Udall would have supported the construction of the Grand Canyon dams had congressional support for them existed in late 1966". As 1967 showed, such support did exist and the pro-dammers, including brother Morris Udall, fought their losing battle vigorously. Had the Administration continued to support one or two dams, the fight could have been continued. 

Somehow, however, Udall knew that Jackson would prevail. How did he know that? Because he knew that if the fight continued, the campaign against the dams would have continued. And he knew, an imponderable, that there would be no good publicity or political rest for him or the Administration in a fight to dam the Grand Canyon. Particularly if it dragged on into 1968, a presidential election year. 

Another imponderable. Jackson had mentored a lawyer named Charles Luce, who early in the Johnson years was appointed to head the Bonneville Power Administration, a key post in the hydro-power based Northwest. Luce and Udall then worked fruitfully together to bring about the Pacific Northwest - Pacific Southwest Intertie. (Water could flow both ways if it was changed to kilowatts first.) So it was no surprise when Udall brought Luce in as his Undersecretary, in September 1966. Luce was not just competent and experienced (he went on to head Con Edison of NY for 15 years) but also a liberal and environmentalist. And what were their discussions over the Colorado Basin legislation about? 

Yes, intrigue, back-stabbing, pragmatism, and deal-making were involved in the key months in late 1966 and early 1967. But frankly, they are only the necessary play in the intensely political atmosphere of congressional legislating. The play, however, took place in a landscape that was changing in ways that Luce, Udall, and Jackson were attuned to. The Sierra Club was both helping to bring about and benefiting from the changes. 

Udall did not give up the dams because "there was no congresional support for them". He turned to alternatives as conservationists had been urging for years, because there was national support for the Grand Canyon, and if he joined, he would have Jackson's support. In that pivotal moment and pivotal role, he re-directed the government's energies onto a path that saved the Grand Canyon, his reputation, and the nation's future.